Banks’ 2023 fossil fuel funding rises to $705bn: Study

: Coal, Natural gas
24/05/13

Fossil fuel financing by the world's 60 largest banks rose to $705bn in 2023, up by 4.8pc from $673bn in 2022, with the increase largely driven by financing for the LNG sector.

This brings the total funding for fossil fuels since the Paris agreement was signed in 2015 to $6.9 trillion.

The 15th annual Banking on Climate Chaos (BOCC) report was released on 13 May by a group of non-governmental and civil society organisations including the Rainforest Action Network and Oil Change International, and it analyses the world's 60 largest commercial and investment banks, according to ratings agency Standard and Poor's (S&P).

Funding had previously dropped in 2022 to $673bn from $742bn in 2021, but this was because higher profits for oil and gas companies had led to reduced borrowing.

JPMorgan Chase was the largest financier of fossil fuels in 2023 at $40.9bn, up from $38.7bn a year earlier, according to the report. It also topped the list for banks providing financing to companies with fossil fuel expansion plans, with its commitments rising to $19.3bn from $17.1bn in 2022.

Japanese bank Mizuho was the second-largest financier, increasing funding commitments to $37bn for all fossil fuels, from $35.4bn in 2022. The Bank of America came in third with $33.7bn, although this was a drop from $37.3bn a year earlier.

Out of the 60 banks, 27 increased financing for companies with fossil fuel exposure, with the rise driven by funding for the LNG sector — including fracking, import, export, transport and gas-fired power. Developers have rallied support for LNG projects as part of efforts to boost energy security after the Russia-Ukraine war began in 2022, and banks are actively backing this sector, stated the report.

"The rise in rankings by Mizuho and the prominence of the other two Japanese megabanks — MUFG [Mitsubishi UFG Financial Group] and SMBC [Sumitomo Mitsui Banking] — is a notable fossil fuel trend for 2023," the report said.

Mizuho and MUFG dominated LNG import and export financing, providing $10.9bn and $8.4bn respectively, to companies expanding this sector. Total funding for the LNG methane gas sector in 2023 was $121bn, up from $116bn in 2022.

Financing for thermal coal mining increased slightly to $42.2bn, from $39.7bn in 2022. Out of this, 81pc came from Chinese banks, according to the report, while several North American banks have provided funds to this sector, including Bank of America.

Some North American banks have also rolled back on climate commitments, according to the report. Bank of America, for example, had previously committed to not directly financing projects involving new or expanded coal-fired power plants or coal mines, but changed its policy in late 2023 to state that such projects would undergo "enhanced due diligence" and senior-level reviews.

The report also notes that most banks' coal exclusions only apply to thermal coal and not metallurgical coal.

Total borrowing by oil majors such as Eni, ConocoPhillips, Chevron and Shell fell by 5.24pc in 2023, with several such as TotalEnergies, ExxonMobil and Hess indicating zero financing for the year.

The BOCC report's finance data was sourced from either Bloomberg or the London Stock Exchange between December 2023 and February 2024.

UK-based bank Barclays, which ranks ninth on the list with $24.2bn in fossil fuel funding, said that the report does not recognise the classification of some of the data. Its "financed emissions for the energy and power sectors have reduced by 44pc and 26pc respectively, between 2020-23," it said.

In response to its increase in financing for gas power, "investment is needed to support existing oil and gas assets, while clean energy is scaled," the bank said.

By Prethika Nair

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24/10/31

China trade tensions could cloud climate summit

China argues that its industrial emissions are needed to provide technology and goods for the global energy transition London, 31 October (Argus) — As the world's leading greenhouse gas emitter, China will struggle to align its reduction efforts closer to those required under the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C global warming target while at the same time fending off trade barriers. "It is imperative to properly handle the relationship between new energy and traditional energy," President Xi Jinping said earlier this year. Chinese CO2 emissions posted zero year-on-year growth in the third quarter, despite a rebound in coal-fired output, as clean power generation also grew rapidly, Helsinki-based Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) says. But Beijing remains guarded on whether its CO2 emissions have peaked, with coal still an integral part of its energy mix. It has set a 2030 target for peak emissions but will likely reach this some years early, the country's new climate envoy, Liu Zhenmin, says. "If we want to achieve global carbon [neutrality], first we have to provide the world with more affordable, secure technology. Second, we need to address financing," Liu says, referring to the finance requested by developing countries from developed countries to enable the former to reach their climate targets. China is set against being dragged into contributing to the new climate finance goal, despite calls from developed countries for it to do so. China deals with climate action on its own terms. It opted out of a pledge to treble renewable power capacity and double energy efficiency at last year's UN Cop 28 climate summit in Dubai, although it did agree to the final conference text, which made mention of the pledge. China's nationally determined contribution (NDC) includes a target date for reaching peak CO2 emissions, but lacks clear goals for peaking emissions of other greenhouse gases such as methane. Beijing is due to update its NDC by February. To remain in line with the Paris accord's 1.5°C target, the new NDC will need to aim for an at least 30pc reduction in CO2 emissions from 2023 levels by 2035 and set absolute reduction targets, CREA says. And sales of new energy vehicles (NEVs) — battery electric, plug-in hybrid and fuel-cell vehicles — need to account for 60pc of total new car sales by 2035, from 50pc currently, to drive transport sector emissions down to 2020 levels, CREA says. China had nearly 25mn NEVs on its roads in June and is on course to quadruple this figure by 2030. Its renewable power capacity has already surpassed a 1.2TW target for 2030, enabling Beijing to cut its approvals for new coal-fired power plants by almost 80pc on the year in January-June, according to environmental group Greenpeace. But China's coal production capacity continues to increase. Chinese power demand is set to rise by more than 500 TWh/yr in the next 5-10 years. Beijing could meet this demand with more renewable and nuclear power generation, but nuclear currently holds a mere 5pc share of China's electricity mix. Brace brace China had seemingly narrowed its climate policy differences with the US in terms of approach and objectives, and played a role alongside the US in bringing a consensus around fossil fuels language at Cop 28. But China is bracing for a showdown on climate finance at Cop 29 in Baku next month. China and advanced economies accounted for more than 95pc of electric vehicle (EV) sales in 2023, energy watchdog the IEA says. But China could be subject to huge new tariffs on exports to the US if Republican candidate Donald Trump wins the US presidential election in November. Tariffs would have to be at 40-50pc to deter Chinese EV imports, consultancy Rhodium says — the EU on 29 October announced a slew of tariffs on Chinese EVs of up to 45pc. Western countries would add $6 trillion to global energy transition costs if they decouple from Chinese products, Liu says. China's carbon emissions by source China's industrial carbon emissions Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2024. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

US court set to weigh biofuel blend mandates

24/10/31

US court set to weigh biofuel blend mandates

New York, 31 October (Argus) — A US court on Friday will weigh some novel issues that could affect enforcement of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), the federal program that sets minimum biofuel blending levels for domestic motor fuel supplies. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in last year's RFS regulation required refiners and importers to blend increasing volumes of renewable fuel from 2023-2025. But the rule differed from past obligations in a crucial way. While the RFS law set annual volume targets of cellulosic, advanced and conventional biofuels through 2022, it tasked EPA with setting volumes in subsequent years by balancing factors such as the environmental impacts of biofuels, energy security, expected production and consumer costs. In a consolidated case to be heard Friday by the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, environmental groups and oil refiners are separately challenging aspects of how the EPA applied those factors in setting 2023-25 volumes. The court has previously affirmed the legality of many RFS rules. "Past cases always give you some perspective on how the DC court might see it," said Susan Lafferty, a partner at law firm Holland & Knight. "But the DC court could also say, ‘not relevant anymore because this is a different part of the statute that we are working with.'" Refiners say EPA misapplied the criteria, upping compliance costs more than necessary by setting targets for cellulosic and conventional biofuels too high and targets for advanced biofuels too low. They also challenge EPA's balancing of potential impacts, noting that the agency assumed that all parties can easily pass the costs of compliance on to consumers. In a separate case this year, the DC Circuit discarded EPA rejections of program waiver petitions, in part because judges disagreed that refiners can easily pass on the cost of Renewable Identification Number (RIN) credits used to show compliance with the RFS program. EPA used this pass-through theory in the 2023-2025 rule "like a magic wand, waving it around to dismiss any argument that the rule will cause harm", the American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers and small refineries said in a case filing. Lafferty expects the judges at Friday's hearing to probe the extent to which EPA's volumes relied on this pass-through theory, "a policy that now this very court has gutted." Environmentalists have similarly targeted EPA's cost analysis, arguing that the agency downplayed the environmental drawbacks of growing crops for energy. The Center for Biological Diversity and the National Wildlife Federation argue that EPA has legal discretion to set post-2022 volumes for corn- and soybean-derived biofuels as low as zero. EPA counters that the court owes the agency deference in evaluating scientific data and making predictive judgments. And biofuel groups that have intervened argue that the program is designed to require more biofuel production even if there are no formal volume requirements in law anymore. While EPA's post-2022 authority to set blend mandates is a new issue, the DC Circuit has handled various cases about EPA's implementation and has generally been deferential to the agency's volume decisions. The court this year upheld 2020-2022 targets. In a 2019 decision, the court kept volumes in place , despite telling EPA to more deeply weigh endangered species impacts. While the court might take issue with some aspects of EPA's latest rule, including the agency's lateness in finalizing volumes, judges could again be reluctant to upend fuel markets if they find only small oversights. Depending on how skeptical judges appear about EPA's arguments on Friday, the case could cause concern for biorefineries. A decision is expected next year, meaning any order for EPA to better justify its decisions or go back to the drawing board would likely fall to the next president's administration. On the panel for Friday's hearing are two judges familiar with the program: Democratic appointee Cornelia Pillard, who wrote the opinion this year upholding 2020-2022 blend mandates, and Republican appointee Gregory Katsas, who dissented and said those volumes were excessive. The third judge on the panel is Democratic appointee J. Michelle Childs. RINcrease or decrease RIN market activity has thinned as participants await the results of the court case and November's presidential election. In its latest rule, EPA aimed to provide a clearer picture over a longer timeline by finalizing volumes over multiple years. But the agency underestimated the growth in renewable diesel production, partly because of unexpectedly high feedstock imports. The result has been persistent oversupply, which took D4 biomass-based diesel credit prices from around 150¢/RIN in spring last year to as low as 42¢/RIN a year later according to Argus assessments. Multiple refiners have consequently dialed back biofuel production. In the past, RIN prices have proven sensitive to legal developments as traders anticipate supply and demand shifts. Prices softened this summer after the DC Circuit vacated small refinery waivers, leaving it unclear whether many facilities would have to buy RIN credits at all. By Cole Martin and Matthew Cope Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2024. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Investment funds’ net long position on Ice TTF jumps

24/10/31

Investment funds’ net long position on Ice TTF jumps

London, 31 October (Argus) — Investment funds' net long position on the Intercontinental Exchange (Ice) TTF jumped by nearly 34TWh on 18-25 October, a week in which the Argus ' TTF front-month price rose by 11pc. The net long position had reached a record high of more than 268TWh in the week ending 30 August , revised data show, before a significant reduction to a recent low of 192TWh by 20 September. Investment funds' net position then remained roughly unchanged over the following weeks. But there was a sharp increase to nearly 236TWh in the week ending 25 October, according to Ice's latest data ( see graph ). This was driven by a 36TWh increase in long positions that was only partly offset by a 2TWh increase in shorts. TTF prices across the curve rose significantly that week, with the Argus TTF front-month contract up by 11pc and similarly large moves for the first-quarter 2025 and summer 2025 contracts. The calendar 2025 price was also up by 9pc ( see table ). Increased geopolitical risks caused by rising tensions in the Middle East may have encouraged investment firms to boost their net long positions over that week, as Israel prepared for a retaliatory strike on Iran that came on 26 October . There was also a switch to net storage withdrawals across the EU on 22-25 October as a result of colder weather, which boosted demand and drew down stocks. Europe's gas market has lost some of its flexibility in recent years, following the loss of most Russian pipeline gas and the resulting higher reliance on LNG, which takes much longer to be physically delivered. This has increased price volatility, as small changes to the gas balance such as minor production constraints in Norway or brief cold snaps are no longer able to be quickly compensated for, which can then drive large price swings. Investment funds, which make most of their money on volatility in the market, amplify these price movements, contributing to the frequent sudden price spikes as fundamentals change. Such a large net long position suggests investment funds expect a tight European gas balance this winter. Record-low freight rates have brought the cost of shipping US LNG to Asia closer to the cost of the shorter US-Europe route, meaning European prices have to rise sufficiently high enough to offset this and close the inter-basin arbitrage again in order to attract uncommitted cargoes. At the same time, Egypt — which became a net LNG importer in May — bought 20 LNG cargoes last month and could seek a similar number of cargoes in the first quarter of next year, further tightening the availability of LNG imports in Europe. Market participants are also concerned about a potential delay to the commissioning of the 27.2mn t/yr Plaquemines terminal in Louisiana, although there has yet to be any confirmation of a change to the timeline. The facility is scheduled to start exports by the end of this year, developer Venture Global said earlier this month. Unlike investment funds, the other two major categories of market participants on Ice — commercial undertakings and investment/credit firms — boosted their net short positions by a combined 33TWh, nearly fully offsetting the net long increase from investment funds. Commercial undertakings, defined as companies with retail portfolios, raised their long and short positions in risk reduction contracts, with longs growing by about 8TWh and shorts by a larger 20TWh. Commercial undertakings' gross short position was nearly 746TWh on 25 October, the highest of any date since December 2021, as firms looked to hedge a significant physical long position of gas in storage. EU storage sites were more than 95pc full as of the morning of 30 October, below 99pc on the same date last year but still well above the 2019-21 average of 90pc. But their net short position is still 163TWh, below the three-year high of nearly 182TWh on 30 August. By Brendan A'Hearn Argus TTF prices, 18-25 Oct €/MWh TTF Nov TTF Dec TTF Q125 TTF Sum 25 TTF Win 25 TTF Cal 25 TTF Cal 26 18-Oct 39.16 39.60 39.91 37.97 38.70 38.60 34.05 25-Oct 43.47 43.69 43.77 41.36 41.51 41.98 35.91 % change 11.0 10.3 9.7 8.9 7.3 8.8 5.5 — Argus Net positions on ICE TTF TWh Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2024. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

Q&A: EU-GCC eye alliance anchored in energy, security

24/10/31

Q&A: EU-GCC eye alliance anchored in energy, security

Dubai, 31 October (Argus) — Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the start of the war in Gaza last year hastened the strengthening of relations between the EU and the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) ꟷ something both blocs had long been striving for. Argus sat down with the EU's special representative for the Gulf region and former Italian foreign minister Luigi di Maio at the Future Investment Initiative in Riyadh this week to discuss his hopes for the future of the relationship. You spoke at the conference about a comprehensive EU-GCC trade agreement. Such a thing has been on the table for a while without really moving forward. Could the first ever EU-GCC summit two weeks ago in Brussels provide the push needed for it to happen? The final statement of the summit clearly emphasised the importance of finalising the negotiation in a positive way, and reaching the free trade agreement at a regional level as soon as possible. Then we can start tailor-made negotiations on trade and investments. This can work in complementarity with the free trade agreement, for instance, on investments and energy co-operation bilaterally. This doesn't mean we are going to kill the free trade agreement at the regional level, but there are some sectorial co-operations that we can implement. This is a very good starting point. I would say the summit was ‘the message' because although our co-operation agreement dates back to the late 1980s, it was the first ever summit. Of course, that also testifies to the gap that we have to fill. This is why the EU approved the new strategy and why there is a special representative to implement this strategy. And why we are working with the Gulf countries to negotiate and implement [it] as soon as possible. Riyadh is where we opened the first ever European Chamber of Commerce in the GCC. The EU and Saudi Arabia are going to sign an energy co-operation MoU by the end of the year. The text has been discussed, and now we will work for the signature. What are the elements of this energy agreement with Saudi Arabia? It is a new framework to co-operate, particularly, on renewables, hydrogen, and technologies linked to renewables. This is very important, and currently in the hands of the EU commissioner for energy, Kadri Simson, and Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, the energy minister of Saudi Arabia. Speaking of hydrogen, Prince Abdulaziz spoke here about Saudi Arabia being one of the lowest-cost producers of hydrogen. We also know that hydrogen is a major element of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor [IMEC] agreement signed at the G20 summit in New Delhi. Is the IMEC project still on the table? And is this growing hydrogen relationship between the EU and the GCC part of it? First, the lesson we, the EU, learned is diversification. So, it's very important to implement our diversification policy on any kind of energy source. It is not only linked to oil, gas or hydrogen, or in general, technologies, raw materials and production. Then there is the issue of how much we can count on the suppliers. The Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and others have always been reliable partners. This is why we see the energy co-operation as a pillar of our partnership. On hydrogen, there is a mutual interest to meet our ambitions. Our ambition, according to the European Commission's REPowerEU proposal, is for the EU to produce 10mn t of hydrogen on its soil by 2030, and import another 10 mn t. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman are working with our companies and member states to export hydrogen to Europe. And I think the development of technologies and new projects around that will be at the core of our future co-operation. If you look at Vision 2030, here in Saudi Arabia, but even in the UAE and in the other countries, many of the goals are in line with our REPowerEU, NextGenerationEU, or the European Green Deal proposals. So there is momentum, and we are taking it. We are trying to fill the gap of the past. And the very important thing, not only about hydrogen, but even about the climate co-operation that is in our final statement [of the EU-GCC summit], is that it's not an "Una tantum" [one-off] event. We are working to have the ministerial foreign ministers' meeting in Kuwait next year and the next EU-GCC summit in Saudi Arabia in 2026. We have a long road ahead to implement the deliverables of the last summit, but also to improve our co-operation on renewables. There was a significant breakthrough at Cop 28 with the mention of fossil fuels in the final declaration. Do you see the growing EU-GCC relationship as a leverage to push GCC countries on their climate agendas and goals? The approach should not be that we push them on their climate agendas. We are working together. And thanks to the multilateral relations, ambitions and policies that we have, we can, even in view of Cop 29, co-ordinate in the same way we did at Cop 28. This is very important, because thanks to their influential foreign policy, on Africa, on central Asia, even sometimes on Latin America, and our ambitions and partners around the world, we can merge our relations to take another step forward on climate policy. But as you said, Cop 28 was historic, as consensus was the most ambitious result of the UN climate Cops, and I think we have to continue on this path together. It is not a matter of pushing someone. It's a matter of co-operation. Our level of partnership with GCC has to switch at a strategic level. We want to create a strategic partnership on peace and prosperity. This is our agreed ambition on both sides. Speaking of peace and prosperity, Iran is involved indirectly in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and its direct confrontation with Israel leaves the GCC sandwiched in the middle. How do you see the EU working with the GCC to attain peace and prosperity, given the increased insecurity in the region? We share with the GCC the interest of peace, prosperity and stability of the region. Because if you look at these countries, what are they doing on Ukraine, like returning children and prisoner exchanges… They are very active, and we appreciate their efforts. So my perception is that the more we work with the GCC on regional stability, the more we will achieve results, because we have a common agenda. They will be very important for the future of the two-state solution, but also for the stability of Lebanon. Even for conveying messages of de-escalation to Iran. The channels with Iran have to be open… to convey messages about nuclear, ballistic missiles, about weapons to Russia for use against Ukraine, and the ‘Axis of Resistance' policy in the region, about the Red Sea and the freedom of navigation. We have to use all the channels we have and the channels the GCC have are precious because of the normalisation processes in the region, just like the Iran-Saudi Arabia one. By Bachar Halabi Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2024. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

UK government consults on oil and gas scope 3 emissions

24/10/30

UK government consults on oil and gas scope 3 emissions

London, 30 October (Argus) — The UK government has opened a consultation seeking views on assessing the effects of scope 3 — or end-use — emissions from proposed offshore oil and gas projects. "Scope 3 emissions from downstream activities need to be assessed… in relation to offshore oil and gas production activities", the government said today. It proposed that a baseline scenario is defined for assessing scope 3 emissions, to set out how the environment "is likely to evolve without the development of a proposed project". The government also proposed that information on "relevant scope 3 categories" is included when a developers applies for a permit. This would include the effects of emissions from the combustion of oil or gas, as well as "other downstream activities", such as refining or transport of fuels. The UK's current process means that developers applying for consent must provide information on scope 1 and 2 — operational — emissions in an environmental statement. But scope 3 emissions are not included, despite making up around 80-95pc of emissions for a typical oil and gas company. The consultation was spurred by a ruling made in June by the UK's Supreme Court. The judgment ruled that consent for an oil development in southern England was unlawful, as the scope 3 emissions were not considered. The government — which was elected in early July, shortly after the ruling — has halted the assessment of any environmental statements related to oil and gas extraction and storage activities, including any that were already being assessed. These would be deferred until the new environmental guidance was in place, expected in spring 2025. The consultation will close on 8 January 2025. Separately, the government will consult by the end of this year on the implementation of its commitment to issue no new oil and gas licences to explore new fields, it said today. The UK has a legally-binding target of net zero emissions by 2050. By Georgia Gratton Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2024. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.

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