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You can unsubscribe from these updates at any time. We manage your personal data in accordance with our privacy policy.Bangladeshi fertilizer producer Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation (BCIC) has issued a tender to buy 15,000t of crushed lump sulphur.
The tender is due to close on 24 November, with the cargo to be shipped to Chattogram within seven weeks of the tender closing.
BCIC previously issued a buy tender for the same quantity of sulphur in July, but it is understood that no award was made.
Sao Paulo, 23 October (Argus) — Brazil's 2026 presidential contenders share the goal of reducing the country's dependence on fertilizer imports, but differ on how to achieve that. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and senator Flavio Bolsonaro are facing off in the second round of the presidential election on 25 October , in what is shaping up to be Brazil's closest presidential race since 1989. Both candidates include reducing external dependence on fertilizers in their policy platforms, agreeing that Brazil's heavy reliance on imported fertilizers poses risks to food security and the agribusiness sector's competitiveness. But they have different views on how to reduce that reliance and on the respective roles of the federal government and the private sector. Lula aims to boost domestic fertilizer production while maintaining state-controlled Petrobras as a key player in the market. His platform highlights the reopening of fertilizer plants in northeastern Sergipe and Bahia states and in southern Parana state, as well as the resumption of investments in central-western Mato Grosso do Sul state, in a bid to keep accelerating domestic production to reduce vulnerability to international crises. Bolsonaro's platform does not mention Petrobras. He instead proposes to boost domestic fertilizer production based on natural gas. Although gas receives relatively limited attention in both candidates' plans, the objective broadly mirrors their fertilizer strategies. Lula's platform keeps Petrobras at the center of Brazil's energy policy, while Bolsonaro emphasizes market competition and private-sector investment. Bolsonaro advocates "supporting national fertilizer production using mineral resources, such as potash and phosphate". Many of these projects will depend on environmental licensing to move forward. Bolsonaro's platform pledges to deliver "an agile, modern environmental licensing system with legal certainty", although it provides few details on how this would be implemented. Bolsonaro's program advocates to reduce the federal government's size. The document — which does not specifically mention the fertilizer sector — signals support for a privatization program, arguing that state participation should be reassessed on a case-by-case basis. His campaign's economic adviser, however, has pledged to not privatize Petrobras . Lula's program also highlights bioinputs as part of its strategy to reduce external fertilizer dependence. The document states that the government should expand incentives for domestic production to lessen reliance on imported chemical fertilizers. The current administration also emphasizes strengthening Brazil's agricultural research agency Embrapa, without providing further details. Fertilizer industry experts and market participants remain somewhat skeptical of the national fertilizer plan, which seeks to reduce Brazil's import dependence by 2050. But many see bioinputs playing a role in reducing dependence on imported nutrients. Sales in the biofertilizer segment increased by 77pc in 2025 to R883mn ($175.3mn), according to Brazil's association of industries of technologies for plant production Abisolo, driven by an increase in new product registrations in the ministry of agriculture and livestock and higher usage by farmers. National fertilizer plan Neither candidate references the national fertilizer plan specifically on their platforms. Former president Jair Bolsonaro launched the plan's first version in May 2022, aiming to reduce the share of fertilizers Brazil sources from imports to around 40pc by 2050. Brazil currently imports 80-85pc of its fertilizer consumption. Lula established Brazil's council of fertilizers and plant nutrition Confert in May 2023 to oversee revisions and implementation of the plan's second version , which expects national fertilizer production to supply around 45-50pc of Brazilian demand by 2050. Lula in September signed into law the fertilizer industry development program Profert, which established guidelines for companies to join the program, introduced a mandatory domestic fertilizer blend and directs resources to credit lines for new projects. Domestic production Brazil consumed 49.1mn metric tonnes (t) of mineral fertilizers in 2025, while imports totaled 43.3mn t that year, according to national fertilizer association Anda. Imports have slowed this year from the previous year and total deliveries to farmers are expected to fall to around 41mn t, according to market participants. The decline reflects higher fertilizer prices following the outbreak of conflict in the Mideast Gulf. Domestic fertilizer production peaked in 2013, when output totaled 9.3mn t in a market that consumed 30.7mn t, according to Anda's historical series that dates back to 2013. Fertilizer consumption growth has gone hand in hand with the expansion of planted acreage in Brazil. Domestic fertilizer production bottomed out in 2020 at 6.5mn t, while deliveries totaled 40.6mn t. The decline in national fertilizer production resulted from a combination of factors over recent years. Brazilian miner Vale was active in the fertilizer market and sold its fertilizer assets to US-based Mosaic in 2016, concluding the deal in 2018. Mosaic curbed output in 2019 in Brazil, announcing the halt at its mining complex at Araxa, the Catalao phosphate plant and its rock mine, as well as another phosphate rock mine in Tapira , due to measures taken by the company to meet the then new regulations of tailing dams in Brazil after the Brumadinho disaster. Likewise, Petrobras decided to exit the fertilizer sector in 2016, with its nitrogen fertilizer plants subsequently leased to Brazilian chemicals company Unigel. Amid the Russia-Ukraine war and the increase in production costs, Unigel exited the fertilizer market, while Petrobras resumed domestic fertilizer production. By Renata Cardarelli Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2026. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.
Sao Paulo, 23 October (Argus) — Brazil's presidential runoff between left-wing incumbent Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and right-wing senator Flavio Bolsonaro could bring sharply different approaches to moving grain and fertilizer across the continent-sized country. Logistics costs in Brazil are among the highest in major agricultural exporting nations. It consumed 15.5pc of Brazil's GDP in 2025, according to the Institute of Logistics and Supply Chain (ILOS). That was nearly double the 8.7pc share reported for the US and slightly above the 13.9pc ratio registered in China, according to data from the Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP) and China's state council, respectively. While both candidates support agribusiness expansion, Lula has emphasized federal infrastructure programs, public-private partnerships and subsidized rural credits since taking office in 2023. Bolsonaro proposes an aggressive private construction effort and private operations. The state provides legal certainty, stable and predictable tariff regulations, and respect for the rationale behind private economic decisions, without interventions that distort market incentives, according to Bolsonaro's infrastructure plan. It is on this basis that private investment would be responsible for construction and operations. Lula said he expects to move forward with Brazil's growth acceleration program if reelected, known as PAC. The government plan invested R280bn ($55.6bn) in infrastructure in 2025 and expects R300bn destined to infrastructure in 2026. Bolsonaro's government plan calls for R900bn in infrastructure investment over four years and identifies logistics costs as one of the main constraints on the competitiveness of Brazilian agriculture. At the center of the proposal are Bolsonaro's "Intelligent Logistics Corridors", designed to improve connections between the central-western grain belt and export terminals. The plan prioritizes projects such as Ferrograo railway , which will link the central-western region — Brazil's largest grain-producing hub — to the Northern Arc export corridor. It also promises to complete the Transnordestina railway , potentially improving grain and fertilizer flows across the northeast. The 1,200km (745.6-mile) Transnordestina railroad connects the northeastern states of Maranhao, Ceara, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, Alagoas, Pernambuco, Sergipe and Piaui. It is considered strategic for inland transportation of grains, fertilizers, cement, fuels and iron ore because it connects key producing areas to the Pecem port complex, in Ceara, and the Suape port, in Pernambuco. Construction started in 2006 but the project has been delayed several times. Bolsonaro's platform also ties logistics policy to fertilizer security, reducing the country's reliance on imports. For commodity markets, the proposal links transportation, mining and agricultural policy more directly than the current administration's approach. Lula's approach ties to long-term national development, decarbonization and the reduction of regional and social inequality. None of the platforms specifically mention Brazil's national land transportation agency ANTT's minimum freight rates, which have been in effect since 2018, cleared by former president Michel Temer. The standard rate came into effect after a truckers' strike over payment and rising diesel prices. The demonstrations blocked major highways and disrupted logistics chains. Credit underwriting Despite the candidates' focus on logistics, access to financing remains a central concern for producers. Lula's platform promises larger volumes of rural credit, financing irrigation systems, machinery and productivity-enhancing technologies, and measures to simplify access to official credit lines. It also proposes expanding funding for family farming and maintaining credit as a tool for agricultural modernization. The government would seek to align interest rates more closely with farm profitability and diversify funding sources through capital markets and agribusiness securities, according to the plan. Bolsonaro's proposal takes a different approach. Rather than committing to larger budgets for Brazil's farm loans program, known as Plano Safra, the platform links access to financing primarily to land titling, legal certainty and debt restructuring mechanisms. The document argues that regularized property ownership would improve producers' ability to obtain credit and invest, but it stops short of defining funding targets, official lending volumes or interest rate objectives for future Plano Safra programs. The debate comes as agricultural groups warn that financing has become one of the sector's main structural constraints. A joint study by agribusiness association ABAG, confederation of insurance companies CNseg and credit, financing and investment association Acrefi estimates that Brazilian agribusiness requires more than R1 trillion in annual funding for production, investment and commercialization, compared with R516.2bn provided under the 2025-2026 Plano Safra. That leaves both candidates facing the same hurdle: translating broad policy goals into mechanisms capable of expanding investment while keeping borrowing costs manageable during a period of elevated interest rates. Whether either strategy can reduce freight costs and close the sector's financing gap may ultimately matter more than campaign rhetoric for Brazil's commodity markets. By João Curi Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2026. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.
London, 19 October (Argus) — Two bulk carriers carrying sulphur shipments from the Middle East have crossed the strait of Hormuz in the past two days despite the heightened risk of Iranian missile and drone attacks against commercial shipping. The 35,062 dwt Calista loaded sulphur in Ruwais, UAE, and has crossed the strait of Hormuz in recent days, likely for delivery to an Indonesian nickel producer, shiptracking data on Kpler show. The 50,992 dwt Exeed loaded in Ras Laffan, Qatar, and also crossed the strait in the past few days, according to Kpler. The destination for this shipment is not yet clear. These crossings come despite as many as 12 incidents last week , according to the to UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO). These include a bulker that was hit alongside a container ship and several oil tankers. This is significant for sulphur shipments, because bulkers were said to not be targeted. Oil tankers have been taking most of the damage in recent months. Vessels mostly have AIS tracking switched off while loading, waiting for crossing after loading cargoes and during the crossing in either direction, appearing back on tracking tools such as Kpler once safely out of the Gulf. Costs for sulphur bulk shipments are estimated at $140s-200/t for 30,000-50,000t as a result of the high risk. There is a limited pool of ships willing to accept these voyages, with additional high insurance costs and risk payments for crew on Hormuz crossings. Freight costs have also risen across regions as a result of higher bunker fuel pricing. These additional costs are limiting achievable netbacks for suppliers inside the strait, and are unlikely to fall unless the security situation improves substantially. By Maria Mosquera Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2026. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.
New York, 16 October (Argus) — At least 12 vessels were attacked in the strait of Hormuz in the last week but many attacks are not being reported, according to UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) Centre. UKMTO, a British Royal Navy-run organization that acts as liaison between military and commercial shipping organizations, said it is struggling to accurately report the true number of attacks in the region since most vessels refuse to report to it. "UKMTO is aware via other sources of incidents but constrained on reporting through lack of verification," the group said today in a weekly update posted at 12:00 GMT. Between 9-13 October, 12 incidents were reported by UKMTO, 10 in the strait of Hormuz, one in the Gulf of Oman and one in the Mideast Gulf. Of the 12 incidents, six vessels continued or reach port, three have damage or unconfirmed outcome, two were disabled or not under command and one was lost. Attacks continue to be concentrated around the southern lane which is the lane where US-assisted transits have been taking place. The US Central Command (Centcom), which oversees US forces in the Middle East, continues to claim control of the strait of Hormuz despite the high number of attacks against commercial vessels in the waterway. "The IRGC has continued to falsely claim control of the Strait of Hormuz," Centcom said on Thursday, referring to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. "The United States and regional partners control the strait as commercial vessels continue to transit despite unwarranted Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps aggression." By Charlotte Bawol Send comments and request more information at feedback@argusmedia.com Copyright © 2026. Argus Media group . All rights reserved.
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