Weight of Freight: Hormuz may not revert to pre-war “normal”
London, 9 April (Argus) — More than a month after hostilities between the US and Iran disrupted shipping through the strait of Hormuz, a two-week truce has raised expectations that traffic could pick up. But transits remain limited, visibility is poor and conditions for passage are still uncertain.
Risk analyst Mohammed al-Basha, founder of the US-based Basha Report risk consultancy, spoke to Argus about the outlook for Hormuz traffic, the debate over potential toll frameworks, and why Yemen's Houthis remain a key swing factor for regional shipping risk.
We now have a ceasefire. Does this mean the war is over?
Early-stage violations are common in ceasefires, and the latest incidents underline how fragile this arrangement is. The US and Iran remain far apart on core demands, so even reaching a temporary truce is an uphill diplomatic effort. In my view, this looks more like a short breather — a limited pause to test whether a more durable ceasefire is feasible — rather than a decisive end to hostilities. Israeli strikes in Lebanon continuing during this period also reinforce that this is not yet a stable de-escalation.
The idea of "tolls" in the strait of Hormuz is a hot topic. How seriously is that being discussed, and what could it look like?
It is being discussed more openly than it was even a month ago, and that alone is a major shift. A toll collection mechanism for Hormuz would be unprecedented and would cut against established freedom-of-navigation norms. More importantly, it risks creating a precedent: if coercive "fees" are accepted in Hormuz, it becomes harder to argue against similar approaches elsewhere, including Bab el Mandeb.
Several models are being floated. One resembles a Suez-style framework, where the canal authority collects a levy and shares revenues. Another is closer to a "management fee" model, where payments are framed as administrative or security-related charges rather than a full toll regime. A third option, promoted by some European interlocutors, involves an international or UN-backed oversight mechanism for transit management. None of these options appears straightforward or sustainable long term, not least because of regional politics: Gulf exporters and shippers would be directly exposed, and it is unclear how states such as the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar or Kuwait would respond to the idea of being effectively taxed on their own trade. Also, most of this oil from the Mideast Gulf is going to China, so you're basically taxing China.
From a shipping perspective, when could traffic get back to normal?
I do not expect a clean return to pre-war patterns. Bab el-Mandeb is a useful reference point: traffic and risk pricing shifted and did not fully revert. Shipping is resilient — operators adjust routes and contingencies quickly — but risk perception changes structurally after a shock.
Over time, this tends to accelerate investment in alternatives. Saudi infrastructure such as the East-West pipeline and Yanbu may take on greater strategic weight beyond emergency use. There is also periodic discussion of longer-term pipeline concepts to the Arabian Sea via Yemen. These are multi-year decisions, but the direction is towards reducing exposure to chokepoint risk.
What are shipowners and operators watching for before they decide to transit or reposition?
Predictability and pricing. Large carriers, insurers and risk firms typically pull back after a shock and reassess. I am already seeing clients pause investment decisions around the eastern side of the Gulf. Some shipowners are also asking very direct questions about what it would cost to move — including whether informal payments or "arrangements" are becoming part of the transit equation. That shift, if it persists, would indicate a move from a temporary crisis response to a new baseline.
Many expected a more active Houthi role during the conflict. Instead, actions remained limited and largely symbolic. Why?
Strategic calculation — and constraints. I see a meaningful split among political elites in Sana'a, including within the Houthi movement and its broader ecosystem, on how far to go. A period of relative quiet was interpreted by some as a sign of autonomy rather than proxy behaviour. When launches resumed, criticism within their circles appeared more openly than before.
What could trigger a return to Houthi maritime attacks, and what is the most likely scenario?
The Houthis are careful about messaging and have tried to frame actions as Israel-focused rather than directly tied to the US–Iran track. They have also outlined potential triggers — including expanded foreign naval operations in the Red Sea or a change in Saudi posture. The most plausible near term driver is domestic: pressure around compensation and reconstruction funding [for Saudi-led intervention in Yemen since 2015]. If they decide their demands are being ignored by Saudi Arabia, they could escalate in a way designed to pressure Riyadh — potentially via cross border activity or disruption signals tied to Yanbu.
To what extent are the Houthis independent from Iran? Are they "puppets"?
I would be cautious with that label. Unlike Hezbollah, the Houthis do not share Iran's Wilayat al Faqih ideological framework; their legitimacy narrative is different, and that creates more room for autonomous decision-making. In capability terms, they have developed domestic capacity in some areas such as drones but remain materially dependent on Iran for higher-end missile systems, including anti-ship capabilities. Their autonomy is therefore mixed rather than absolute.
When the Houthis do attack, how do they select targets — structured intelligence or opportunistic?
Their definition of "Israel-linked" is broad. It can include ownership, investors, board links, business ties, or port calls — and that breadth increases the scope for error. Outdated information, misidentification and operational mistakes can expose vessels beyond the stated target set, which is why even ships with no obvious connection may face elevated risk during periods of escalation.
Are we entering a more stable phase, or just a different kind of uncertainty?
I expect instability to persist. This phase is not over.
Is that measured in months or years?
Months.
Author name: Andrey Telegin, Associate Editor, Argus Freight
